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CAN MANAGERIAL KNOWLEDGE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
ENCOURAGE OR DETER REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT?
AN ANALYSIS OF R&D REPORTING METHODS
By Andrea L. Gouldman, Ph.D., CPA
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013.
Chair: Carolyn S. Norman, Ph.D., CPA
Professor and Chair of the Department of Accounting
Virginia Commonwealth University
Co-chair: Alisa G. Brink, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Accounting
Virginia Commonwealth University

This study examines the effects of research and development (R&D) reporting method
and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation decisions.
The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating
both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor compensation
(control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs.
knowledge of restricted stock compensation). Using salient short-term incentives to motivate real
earnings management, this study demonstrates that capitalization may result in managers
foregoing economically efficient R&D investment opportunities. The results indicate that
managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation structure has little influence on managers’
R&D project continuation choices. However, when managers capitalizing R&D expenditures had
knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted (short-term) stock compensation their
perceived personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. Participants who

capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor received restricted (longterm) stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to please their supervisor
significantly higher than all other participants. Additionally, participants with knowledge that
their supervisors restricted stock compensation were significantly more concerned about the
likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. These
findings contribute to the management accounting literature by providing new insights on the
influence of knowledge of supervisor compensation on managerial decision making as well as
additional insights into the factors that contribute to and limit real earnings management. This
study also extends the literature on R&D by providing evidence of the potential for real earnings
management when R&D expenditures are capitalized in the absence of personal responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the issuance of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 2, there
has been an ongoing discussion of the pros and cons of expensing versus capitalizing research
and development (R&D) expenditures. One aspect of this debate centers on the opportunities for
real earnings management (RM). RM is a type of earnings management that occurs when
managers undertake actions that deviate from best practices to meet certain earnings thresholds
(Roychowdhury 2006). The preponderance of prior research proposes that mandatory R&D
expensing provides incentives for managers to underinvest in R&D as a means to increase
reported earnings (Baber et al. 1991; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2010; Roychowdhury
2006). However, recent research suggests that R&D capitalization may also provide incentives
for RM in the form of overinvestment in failing R&D projects (Seybert 2010). More
specifically, when R&D is capitalized, managers may delay discontinuing or overinvest in a
failing project to avoid the negative reporting consequences of impairing the original project
asset. The present study further investigates the potential for RM when R&D expenditures are
capitalized.
The Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.’s (ISS) most recent global survey on
corporate governance proposes that executive compensation will be the most important
governance topic for the upcoming year (ISS 2012). Further, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has been taking actions to address concerns about executive compensation
for several years. In 2006, the SEC overhauled the old executive compensation disclosure rules.
Item 402 of Regulation S-K was revised (effective December 2006) requiring public companies
to increase and simplify executive compensation disclosures, among other things, to assist with
shareholder understanding (SEC 2007). Notwithstanding these changes, concerns about
3

executive compensation practices at public companies continued and were addressed again in
specific provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank Act) (Morrison and Foerster 2010). More specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the
SEC to come up with disclosure rules addressing the association between executive
compensation and the company’s financial performance in addition to the proportion of the
executives’ total compensation relative to the median compensation of all other employees
(Deloitte 2012; SEC 2012).
While additional information about executive compensation may provide shareholders
with more clarity about how executives are compensated, an interesting question arises: Will
knowledge of an executive’s compensation package impact the behavior or decisions of that
individual’s subordinates? Taken together with R&D, it remains an open question as to how (or
if) a firm’s R&D reporting method might interact with knowledge of a supervisor’s
compensation package to impact certain managerial decisions, such as whether or not to continue
a failing R&D project. To better understand the factors that may help managers make value
maximizing R&D investment decisions, this study examines the impact of R&D reporting
method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation
decisions.
The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design,
manipulating both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor
compensation (control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock
compensation vs. knowledge of restricted stock compensation). While prior research investigates
reputation or project responsibility based motivations for RM under the capitalization reporting
method (Seybert 2010), motivations related to performance-contingent incentives remain
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unexplored. The current study addresses this gap in the literature by examining RM decisions in
an experimental setting with salient performance-contingent incentives. Specifically, project
continuation or RM is motivated by a short-term performance-contingent incentive. Short-term
incentive structures have been linked to both real and discretionary accrual earnings management
(Balsam 1998; Carter et al. 2009; Chow et al. 2000; Healy 1985; Ibrahim and Lloyd 2011).
Participants in this study are asked to allocate R&D funds between two projects. They
may either allocate funds towards continuing an original failing project or towards developing a
new alternative project. When R&D expenditures are expensed, the manager does not benefit
from project continuation. Regardless of supervisor incentive horizon, it is expected that
managers will be less likely to continue the project when R&D expenditures are expensed. In
contrast, when R&D expenditures are capitalized, the manager benefits from project
continuation. An impairment loss would be triggered if the original project is discontinued
prohibiting participants from receiving their current year bonus. It is predicted that RM will be
dependent on the supervisor’s compensation package. Under capitalization, when managers have
knowledge that their incentive horizon is aligned with that of their supervisor (i.e. both shortterm) altruism, other regarding preferences, moral disengagement theory, and attribution theory
indicate that the presence of an additional beneficiary will create an additional motivation for
managers to continue the original project or engage in RM. In contrast, when managers have
knowledge that their incentive horizon is misaligned with that of their supervisor (i.e. the
manager has a short-term horizon and the supervisor has a long-term horizon) accountability
pressures and impression management can deter managers from engaging in RM. Therefore, it is
anticipated that supervisor incentive horizon will moderate the relationship between R&D
reporting method and managers’ willingness to continue with a failing project.

5

This study makes several valuable contributions. First, due to the magnitude of spending
on R&D, research that can inform practice is important (Seybert 2010). For example, the U.S. is
the worldwide leader in R&D spending and for the past three decades R&D spending accounted
for approximately 2.5 percent of the gross domestic product (Bernanke 2011). In the past 35
years, median R&D spending accelerated nearly twice as fast as average spending. Additionally,
corporate R&D spending approximately doubles that of print and broadcast media advertising
and is equivalent to roughly half of the amount spent on capital expenditures (Hirschey et al.
2012). Observably, R&D is a significant expense for many companies (Oswald and Zarowin
2007).
Second, the increased use of R&D capitalization in the U.S. and worldwide suggests that
the present study has the potential to inform regulators. Given the R&D reporting differences
between U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), there is continued discussion regarding what method will ultimately
be adopted upon the convergence of these standards. U.S. executives have expressed concerns
over the significance of potentially changing R&D reporting methods. These executives rank the
differences of accounting for R&D under U.S. GAAP and IFRS as an area that will require
substantial effort for conversion and impact their companies’ financial statements (PwC 2011). It
is important for regulators, executives, and investors to understand the economic differences and
behavioral implications associated with these alternative R&D reporting methods as they prepare
for the more widespread adoption of IFRS.
Third, results of the present study may shed light on corporate practices that might be
used to circumvent transparency in financial reporting. The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX 2002) significantly changed the financial reporting environment by providing greater
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penalties for fraudulent financial reporting. However, Bartov and Cohen (2009, 508) warn that
“investors and other capital market participants should pay more attention to real earnings
management activities used to meet certain earnings targets than in the pre-SOX period”. These
authors suggest that some companies may be using RM as a covert method for questionable
financial reporting.
When managers were asked to make an absolute decision to continue or discontinue the
original project, as expected managers were more likely to continue the project when R&D
expenditures were capitalized relative to expensed. One implication of this study is that even in
the absence of personal responsibility, there is the potential for RM when R&D expenditures are
capitalized. However, in the absence of an absolute choice the differential impact on project
continuation between the two R&D reporting methods was less clear.
The results of this study do not support the hypotheses that managerial knowledge of
supervisor compensation structure influences R&D project continuation choices. However,
analyses of the debriefing questions provide some meaningful insight into the potential
psychological effects of knowledge of supervisor compensation in managerial decision making.
Consistent with attribution theory, when decision makers who capitalized R&D expenditures had
knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted stock compensation their perceived
personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. As predicted by self-presentation
theory, participants who capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor
received restricted, long-term stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to
please the CTO significantly higher than all other participants. Additionally, participants with
knowledge that their supervisors receive restricted stock compensation were significantly more

7

concerned about the likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting
method.
The remainder of this proposal is organized as follows. The next section identifies the
appropriate literature for the study and develops the hypotheses. Section three describes the
methodology for the study, which is followed by the results in Section four. Section V concludes
by offering limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Real Earnings Management

Earnings management involves using accounting principles or making business decisions
in such a way that allows the company to present itself in the best possible light. RM occurs
when a manager alters the operations of the firm in a way that is not consistent with normal or
best business practices with the intent of meeting certain earnings thresholds (Roychowdhury
2006). This is achieved by timing investment or financing decisions in a manner that
intentionally alters reported earnings (Schipper 1989). These actions tend to be short sighted,
generating a desired short-term gain or loss in exchange for lower future cash flows. Because
RM directly affects cash flows in the current period, it may also be more costly to firms from a
taxation perspective (Zang 2007). Therefore, unlike accruals-based earnings management, RM is
often accompanied by a real cost to the firm in the form of decreased long-term firm value (e.g.,
Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Gunny 2010; Hunton et al. 2008).
Although accruals-based earnings management may be less costly than giving up longterm firm value, managers appear to prefer managing earnings through real activities over
accrual manipulations (Graham et al. 2005). There are several potential explanations for why
8

managers may prefer RM techniques over accruals-based earnings management. Prior empirical
evidence implies that accounting standards can influence how firms choose to manage earnings
(Cohen et al. 2008; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Zang 2007). The majority of this research
focuses on the substitution effect between accruals-based and RM. As accounting standards
become more restrictive, discretion for manipulating accruals is reduced (Ewert and Wagenhofer
2005). Thus, when managers have fewer permissible accounting alternatives available or less
opportunities to manipulate accruals, they are likely to replace accruals-based earnings
management with RM (Chi et al. 2011; Demski 2004; Drymiotes 2011; Ewert and Wagenhofer
2005; Schipper 2003; Wang and D’Souza 2006).
The substitution between accruals-based and RM is also likely to occur when regulatory
or auditor scrutiny increases (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Demski 2004; Gunny 2010; Schipper 2003;
Zang 2012). RM tends to be less transparent and thus more difficult for shareholders, regulators,
and auditors to detect (Cohen et al. 2008; Wang and D’Souza 2006). Both Cohen et al. (2008)
and Bartov and Cohen (2009) find evidence consistent with an increase in RM in the periods
following the passage of SOX. Similarly, while higher quality auditors are effective in curtailing
accruals-based earnings management, such a situation is often accompanied by higher levels of
RM (Chi et al. 2011).
In addition to the passage of SOX, the recent global economic crisis and recession has
challenged the U.S. financial regulatory system and auditing profession (Kothari and Lester
2012). In response to the economic crisis, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) submitted several legislative reform recommendations to Congress, all of which
support enhanced transparency in financial reporting (Melancon 2010). In addition to changing
the accounting standards to provide greater transparency, any changes in accounting standards
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should be accompanied by “greater enforcement, sound auditing practices, and commensurate
regulatory vigilance (Kothari and Lester 2012, 350).” These authors suggest that such
mechanisms will remain important as the U.S. standards continue to evolve through the
convergence with IFRS. Further, the Dodd-Frank Act is working to improve transparency in the
financial system (SEC 2012). In view of the fact that prior research indicates that increased
regulatory and auditor scrutiny, and transparency, make accruals-based earnings management
more difficult, it is likely that RM will continue to be the preferred method for managing
earnings.
There are a number of methods of RM that companies might choose, all of which impact
earnings in current and future periods. Some of the choices might be to lower prices near the end
of the year to move sales into the current year, to delay investments until a later period, to extend
more lenient credit terms, to sell fixed assets, or to delay or overinvest in R&D projects. R&D
expenditures have a material impact on earnings and stock returns for most companies engaged
in R&D activities (Oswald and Zarowin 2007). Given the prevalence of RM and the potentially
significant long-term economic consequences of managers’ R&D investment decisions, it is
important to understand how R&D accounting methods influence managers’ use of RM
techniques.
R&D Reporting Method
With the exception of certain software costs (SFAS No. 86, 1985), R&D capitalization is
not permissible for U.S. firms. U.S. GAAP requires material R&D activities to be expensed and
disclosed in the financial statements when incurred (SFAS No. 2, 1974; Codification Topic 730,
2009). Since the release of SFAS No. 2, there has been an ongoing debate about whether the U.S.
should revert back to capitalization (Oswald and Zarowin 2007). The recent convergence efforts
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between the FASB and IASB, as well as the SEC’s acceptance of the use of IFRS without
reconciliation from foreign filers, have reenergized this dialogue. Unlike U.S. GAAP, qualified
development costs are permitted to be capitalized under IFRS (IAS 38, 2004). The ability to
manage earnings through the use of real techniques also differs between these two standards, as
discussed in the next section. The FASB continues to work with the IASB in an effort to
converge to a single set of high quality, global accounting standards (FASB 2012). Given the
R&D reporting differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, it is important to understand the
economic differences and behavioral implications associated with these differing reporting
methods as the discussion continues about what method will ultimately be adopted upon the
convergence of these standards.
Effects of R&D Reporting Method on Real Earnings Management

Following the adoption of SFAS No. 2, early research provides evidence of a small or
weak, but consistently negative, relation between mandatory expensing and R&D investment
(e.g., Dukes et al. 1980; Wasley and Linsmeier 1992). These studies focus on expensing as a
mechanism for managers to manipulate R&D spending. When R&D is expensed, a reduction in
R&D expenditures results in an equivalent increase in pretax income which immediately
improves earnings. Several studies provide additional insight into the motivation behind this
form of RM. Archival evidence suggests that managers reduce their investments in R&D to meet
or exceed earnings targets and analysts’ expectations, (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and Sloan
1991; Gunny 2005; Gunny 2010; Perry and Grinaker 1994; Roychowdhury 2006), avoid
seasoned equity offering underpricing (Cohen and Zarowin 2010), and avoid potential debt
covenant violations (Kim et al. 2010). Survey evidence supplements archival findings. For
example, Graham et al. (2005) find that the majority of executives they surveyed admit that they
11

would be willing to engage in RM to meet earnings targets (80 percent) or smooth earnings (78
percent). Collectively, these studies suggest that managers view R&D expenditures as an
opportunity to alter short-term income in a way that is more appealing to the market.
Requiring mandatory R&D capitalization has been suggested as a potential remedy for
the RM problems identified with expensing R&D. Capitalization reduces the impact of R&D
expenditures on current period earnings because the R&D expense is spread over several periods
(Seybert 2010). Oswald and Zarowin (2007) investigate firms in the United Kingdom that
voluntarily chose whether to expense or capitalize their R&D expenditures. Consistent with the
premise that capitalization reduces underinvestment in R&D, firms voluntarily capitalizing have
significantly higher investment levels in R&D than firms that expense. Other studies advocating
the use of capitalization focus on the potential informational benefits such as stock price
informativeness and correlations with future economic returns (e.g., Healy et al. 2002; Kothari et
al. 2002; Lev and Zarowin 1999; Oswald and Zarowin 2007).

While there are potential benefits to capitalizing R&D expenditures, there may also be
unintended consequences. An innovative experimental study by Seybert (2010) takes behavioral
considerations into account and offers evidence suggesting that capitalization can provide
incentives for managers to engage in RM in the form of overinvestment in R&D. Discontinuing a
failing R&D project under capitalization requires impairment of the R&D project that was
recorded as an asset in prior years when the carrying value of the asset exceeds the sum of future
cash flows.1 Thus, when R&D is capitalized managers may delay discontinuing or overinvest in

1

SFAS No. 144 uses undiscounted future cash flows whereas SFAS No. 142 and IAS 36 use discounted future cash
flows.
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a failing project, potentially forgoing a superior alternative project, to avoid the negative
reporting consequences of impairing the original project asset.2

Capitalization and Responsibility Driven Real Earnings Management
Seybert (2010) finds that managers personally involved in selecting a R&D project are
more likely to continue with the failing project when expenditures are capitalized despite the
availability of a more profitable alternative than managers assigned to the project. This tendency
to overinvest with personal responsibility is consistent with “escalation of commitment.”
Escalation of commitment was first described by Staw (1976) as the tendency of individuals to
commit additional resources to a chosen course of action despite the risk of future negative
consequences in order to justify a prior decision. The motivation to escalate commitment is
stronger when an individual is personally responsible for selecting a project as personal
responsibility tends to exacerbate an individual’s perceived need to justify their previous
investment (Brockner 1992; Sleesman et al. 2012; Staw 1976).

Seybert (2010) also demonstrates a link between overinvestment and reputation concerns,
as his results indicate that high self-monitors (individuals who closely monitor their behavior to
maintain desired public appearances) are more likely to overinvest than low self-monitors to
avoid reputation damage. Managers may feel that abandoning a project that they previously
selected reveals a possible flaw in their prior decision making logic. Admitting that a previous
decision was mistaken could potentially bring into a question a manager’s talent and hurt his or
her opportunities in the labor market (Kanodia et al. 1989). To supplement and further support

2

Entwistle (1999) conducts a series of interviews with firm executives and finds that many opposed capitalization
based in part on the concerns about future impairments if the project turns out to be unprofitable. The executives
interviewed tended to have a preference for recognizing expenses in the current period in exchange for higher future
profits.
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his findings, Seybert (2010) conducted a follow-up survey and found that experienced executives
anticipate that managers will be more likely to overinvest when R&D is capitalized.

Seybert (2010) only finds a significant difference in RM between R&D methods when
managers are personally responsible for the original investment decision. He observes no
significant difference in the tendency to conduct RM between R&D methods when managers are
not personally responsible for making the original investment decision. Thus, Seybert (2010)
concludes that when managers are personally responsible for the original investment, RM
increases when R&D is capitalized. As acknowledged by Seybert (2010, 675) this result is
consistent with escalation of commitment behavior.

The question arises as to whether his results are driven by escalation of commitment. If
not, the question arises as to why he finds no relation between R&D capitalization and RM in the
absence of manager responsibility for the original investment. This study posits that R&D
capitalization can significantly impact RM in the absence of escalation of commitment if
managers’ incentives to manage earnings are salient. By assigning the project to the manager
rather than giving the manager personal responsibility for the selection of the project, this study
removes the confounding influence of escalation of commitment. Further, this study provides
salient incentives for overinvestment by describing the manager’s short-term performancecontingent annual bonus.

Capitalization and Performance Contingent Incentives for Real Earnings Management
If the opportunity arises, the principal-agent model presumes that responsible decision
makers will act in a self-serving manner (Hunton et al. 2008). Further, the bonus-maximization
hypothesis purports that managers are likely to make discretionary accounting decisions to
14

maximize their short-term bonus compensation (Ibrahim and Lloyd 2011). There is extensive
prior research linking short-term bonus compensation to accruals-based earnings management
behavior (e.g., Balsam 1998; Carter et al. 2009; Guidry et al. 1999; Healy 1985; Ibrahim and
Lloyd 2011). Short-term incentive structures can also provide motivation for managers to engage
in R&D related RM. An archival study conducted by Hoskisson et al. (1993) documents a
negative relation between short-term performance incentives and total R&D intensity. These
findings suggest that managers reduce discretionary R&D spending or engage in RM to
maximize their incentive compensation. An experimental study by Hunton et al. (2008) also
provides evidence consistent with RM (reducing discretionary R&D spending) increasing in the
presence of a short-term incentive horizon.
Consistent with agency theory, the bonus maximization hypothesis, and the findings of
Hoskisson et al. (1993) and Hunton et al. (2008), it is expected that short-term performancecontingent incentives will also encourage RM in the form of overinvestment in a failing R&D
project. As previously discussed, discontinuing a failing project under the capitalization
reporting method typically requires impairment of the R&D project that was recorded as an asset
in prior years. If the impairment loss reduces current net income to a level that precludes
managers from meeting their annual bonus target, they may delay discontinuing or overinvest in
the failing project to secure their annual bonus. This conflict of interest does not exist when
R&D expenditures are expensed because prior period expenditures have already been deducted
from net income. Thus, there is no asset to impair in the current year. In sum, when short-term
incentives to maximize current income are present, the expected influence of reporting method
on the continuation decision of a failing project is that capitalization will provide incentives for
managers with short-term incentives to engage in activities that are consistent with earnings

15

management of real activities (i.e., overinvesting in a failing R&D project). In contrast, managers
required to expense R&D expenditures will benefit the most from discontinuing the project.
They will be more likely to discontinue the project and redirect resources into a more profitable
alternative project. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: Managers with short-term incentives to maximize current earnings will be more
willing to continue with a failing project when R&D expenditures are capitalized
relative to when such expenditures are expensed.
Knowledge of Supervisor Incentive
Drawing on agency theory and the bonus-maximization hypothesis, Hypothesis 1 posits
that managers with short-term performance contingent incentives will be more likely to engage
in RM when the R&D reporting method provides economic incentives to do so (i.e., when R&D
expenditures are capitalized relative to when such expenditures are expensed). However,
monetary rewards may be an incomplete motivation. Prior research provides evidence that
individuals oftentimes deviate from the behavior that agency or conventional economic theory
would predict, even if doing so decreases their payoff (Camerer 2003; Cohen et al. 2007; Evans
et al. 2001; Rabin 2002). Thus, it is expected that managers will not be motivated exclusively by
self-interest to maximize their personal wealth by continuing the project when expenditures are
capitalized despite the financial incentive to do so. The expected benefits or utility that an
individual receives from a course of action is a combination of both nonsocial (personal) and
social utility. One type of social utility would be the influence of an action or decision on
another’s payment or wealth (Gino et al. 2012). This study argues that knowledge of a
supervisor’s compensation structure is a social factor that potentially influences managers’
project continuation decisions.

16

Non-Restricted Stock Compensation (Short-Term Incentive)

If a supervisor has an incentive to maximize short-term earnings, then both the manager
and supervisor will benefit from project continuation when R&D expenditures are capitalized.
The presence of an additional beneficiary, the supervisor, may influence managers’ project
continuation choices. Theory and data suggest that altruism, or making decisions and behaving
with the goal of benefiting another, is a part of human nature (Piliavin and Charng 1990). Thus,
there may also be intrinsic motivations to arrive at an outcome that benefits others (Gino et al.
2012; Itoh 2004; Loewenstein et al. 1989). Prior data provides evidence that people have otherregarding preferences. Individuals are willing to sacrifice for others and incorporate features
such as fairness, equity, and reciprocity into decision making (Itoh 2004). Concern for others can
potentially lead to undesirable behavior, such as RM. This effect is amplified when combined
with benefits to one’s self. For example, a recent study by Gino et al. (2012) finds an increased
propensity to engage in acts of dishonesty that benefit others when such actions also provide
benefits to one’s self. Accordingly, the additional benefit that RM provides the supervisor may
provide increased motivation for managers to engage in RM beyond the incentive to maximize
personal wealth.
Managerial behavior is likely influenced by factors other than altruism and other
regarding preferences. The shared financial rewards resulting from RM when both the manager
and their supervisor are compensated with short-term incentives are expected to help managers
more easily justify and rationalize their self-interested actions (Church et al. 2012; Davis et al.
2006; Gino et al. 2012). Bandura’s (1990) moral disengagement theory purports that individuals
are more likely to behave unethically if they are not the sole beneficiary of such behavior. People
self-regulate their behavior using generally accepted moral standards. Individuals tend to avoid
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behavior that violates these standards as doing so creates a psychological cost which is selfcondemnation. However, these moral standards are not fixed. An additional beneficiary may
enable individuals to cognitively process the decision in a way that allows them to morally
disengage or discount the moral concerns associated with the decision without feeling distress.
In other words, individuals unconsciously shift the decision to be compatible with their moral
standards (Church et al. 2012).
Moral disengagement theory implies that a shared interest makes unethical or
questionable behavior more self-justifiable to an individual. In general, humans have an
unconscious self-serving bias predisposing them to gather, process, and remember information in
a self-serving way. Self-serving justifications are based on genuine, but biased, self-assessments.
This unconscious bias helps people protect their self-image, feel better about their decisions, and
ultimately persuade themselves that their behavior is acceptable (Gino et al. 2012; Merkl-Davies
and Brennan 2011; Moore et al. 2006; Prentice 2007).
Attribution theory suggests that individuals who engage in unethical behavior tend to
externalize attribution for such acts to other individuals or environmental factors. For example,
rather than admit that unethical behavior was motivated by personal self-interest, an individual
might claim that such behavior was necessary to conform with social expectations or norms (e.g.,
behaviors that superiors demand from subordinates, or behaviors that are consistent with what
others would do under those conditions). Making external attributions or shifting responsibility is
a coping mechanism that allows individuals to rationalize their behavior (Baird and Zelin 2009;
Davis et al. 2006). When supervisors have short-term incentives, managers may assume that their
supervisor would make wealth maximizing choices and would expect subordinates to act in a
similar manner. Thus, managers may attribute their RM behavior to factors beyond their control.
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Such reasoning will likely allow managers to shift some or all of the responsibility of RM away
from themselves and onto their supervisors.
Per moral disengagement theory it is expected that managers will be able to more easily
justify RM and thus be more likely to continue a failing project when the benefit of doing so is
shared. Further, attribution theory proposes that managers can more easily rationalize their selfinterested behavior by attributing their behavior to what their supervisor would expect them to
do. Collectively these theories, as well as a preference for altruism, suggest that when a manager
is aware that the supervisor has an incentive that encourages maximizing current period earnings,
s/he will be more likely to continue the project when expenditures are capitalized (or engage in
real earnings management) than in the absence of this knowledge. Accordingly, when R&D
expenditures are capitalized, it is predicted that the potential benefits to the supervisor will create
an additional motivation for managers to continue the original project or manage earnings
through real activities. This predicted effect is formally recognized in the following hypothesis:

H2: When R&D expenditures are capitalized, managers with knowledge that their
supervisors have non-restricted stock compensation will be more willing to continue
with a failing project than will managers with no knowledge of their supervisors’
compensation package.
Restricted Stock Compensation (Long-term Incentive)

When a supervisor has a long-term incentive, then s/he will not benefit from continuing a
failing R&D project when R&D expenditures are capitalized. Given a situation where the
manager has short-term incentives, the resulting incentive misalignment creates a potential
conflict of interest. While avoiding an impending impairment loss by continuing a R&D project
will increase short-term earnings (consistent with the manager’s short-term incentives), project
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continuation conflicts with the long-term welfare of the supervisor, organization, and its
stakeholders.
Knowledge that the supervisor’s compensation structure incentivizes long-term earnings
may discourage managers from engaging in RM. Managers’ decisions in conflict of interest
situations may be influenced by accountability pressures. A conflict of interest can enhance
managers’ perceived accountability or the obligation to explain previous decisions when asked to
do so. Accountability demands create pressure to behave in a way that can be acceptably justified
(Beeler and Hunton 1997; Hunton et al. 2010; Kirby and Davis 1998; Merkl-Davies and Brennan
2011). The dominant accountability pressure a manager experiences at work originates from
individuals in positions of power within the organization (i.e., a manager’s supervisor).
Managers are likely to perceive that their supervisors will more closely scrutinize their behavior
when there is a conflict of interest such as misaligned incentive horizons. Prior accountability
research indicates that the misalignment between managers’ and supervisors’ incentive horizons
may compel managers to become unsure and more critical of their decision making (MerklDavies and Brennan 2011).
The requirement to justify one’s previous judgments and decisions encourages deliberate
attitude shifting which typically results in a de-biasing effect (Fox and Staw 1979; Moore et al.
2006; Tetlock et al. 1989). Specifically, accountability encourages more accurate decision
making by causing decision makers to be less influenced by prior beliefs, focus more on
available evidence, and ultimately make more complex judgments (Simonson and Staw 1992).
Accordingly, when a manager is aware that his or her supervisor has a conflicting incentive
horizon, it is expected that demands for accountability will discourage project continuation as it
will be more challenging for managers to justify overinvestment in the failing project. In other
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words, it will be more difficult for managers to defend decisions driven by the desire to
maximize personal wealth when they know that such decisions will have a detrimental impact on
their supervisor’s wealth.
According to self-presentation theory, individuals are motivated to purposefully manage
the impression others have of them (Sleesman et al. 2012). Managers may make choices they
feel will be viewed favorably by their superiors in order to manage their superiors’ perceptions
or impressions of them as subordinates. Impression management, a common phenomenon in
organizations, is a process where individuals attempt to present themselves in a way that will be
perceived positively by others (Bolino and Turnley 1999; Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011;
Wayne and Linden 1995). Prior organizational behavior research indicates that impression
management strategies can alter supervisors’ perceptions about employees and lead to employee
benefits, such as better future performance evaluations and career advancement opportunities
(Wayne and Linden 1995). Research in social psychology suggests that impression management
can be motivated by the social presence of others whose behavior management is trying to
anticipate. Other psychological factors driving impression management include the desire to
maximize rewards and minimize sanctions (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011).
A company’s incentive structure creates an implicit pressure for managers to infer what
their supervisors want without being given explicit direction (Baird and Zelin 2009; Prentice
2007). In the context of the current study, managers will likely anticipate that their supervisors
will not support the use of RM because it conflicts with their supervisors’ incentives. Managers’
fears of negative repercussions and reputation damage may intensify suspecting that the
supervisor views RM as undesirable behavior. Further, the fear of failing to please their
supervisors may cause managers significant stress due to the negative impact it could potentially
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have on their careers. Managers will likely anticipate that engaging in RM will cause their
supervisors to respond in undesirable ways, for example, in the form of unfavorable performance
evaluations or recommendations for career advancement. Thus, it is expected that selfpresentational motives will encourage managerial behavior or choices consistent with the
preferences of upper-level management (i.e., avoiding the use of RM) to counteract the potential
negative consequences of failing to do so.
Managers are expected to take their supervisors’ compensation into account when
making decisions that influence net income in current and future periods. When a manager is
aware that their supervisor has a conflicting long-term compensation structure, it is likely that
they will feel greater accountability pressures to behave in ways that can be acceptably justified.
Further, self-presentation theory suggests that managers may avoid RM in an effort to present
themselves favorably to supervisors. Personal financial gains that managers would receive from
making the decision to continue a failing R&D project will likely be outweighed by the increased
perceived need to justify their decisions and the desire to maintain a positive reputation in the
organization. In other words, the conflict of interest created by the knowledge that the supervisor
has a long-term incentive will deter managers from continuing the original project or managing
earnings through real activities. Accordingly, when R&D expenditures are capitalized, it is
anticipated that managers who are aware that their supervisor has a compensation package with
restricted stock compensation will be less likely to continue the original project (or engage in
real earnings management) than in the absence of this knowledge. The above discussion leads to
the following hypothesis:

H3: When R&D expenditures are capitalized, managers with knowledge that their
supervisors have restricted stock compensation will be less willing to continue with a
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failing project than will managers with no knowledge of their supervisors’
compensation package.
Interaction between R&D Reporting Method and Supervisor Incentive Horizon

When R&D expenditures are expensed, the manager does not benefit from project
continuation. Regardless of supervisor incentive horizon, it is expected that managers will be less
likely to continue the project with the expensing method. Conversely, the effect of capitalization
on RM is dependent on the supervisor’s incentive horizon. When a manager’s incentive horizon
is aligned with that of their supervisor (i.e., both short-term) moral disengagement theory,
attribution theory, and a preference for altruism indicate that the presence of an additional
beneficiary, the supervisor, will increase managerial motivation to continue the original project
or engage in RM when R&D expenditures are capitalized. In contrast, when the manager has a
short-term horizon and the supervisor has a long-term horizon, accountability pressures and
impression management are hypothesized to deter managers from continuing the original project
when R&D expenditures are capitalized. The predicted difference in RM between the two R&D
reporting methods should be greatest when the managers have knowledge that their supervisors
are being compensated with short-term, non-restricted stock compensation, next greatest when
managers have no knowledge of supervisor compensation and lowest when managers have
knowledge that their supervisors are compensated with long-term, restricted stock compensation.
Accordingly, it is anticipated that supervisor incentive horizon will moderate the relationship
between R&D reporting method and managers’ willingness to continue with a failing project.
This predicted interaction is formally reflected in the following hypothesis:
H4: The difference in managers’ willingness to continue with a failing project
between R&D reporting methods will be greatest when managers have knowledge
that their supervisors are compensated with non-restricted stock compensation, next
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greatest when managers have no knowledge of their supervisors’ compensation, and
lowest when managers have knowledge that their supervisors are compensated with
restricted stock compensation.
III. METHOD

Design and Participants

This study utilizes a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating both R&D reporting
method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor compensation (control group with
no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of restricted
stock compensation). Graduate students enrolled in business courses from a large public
university were recruited for voluntary participation in experimental sessions and were randomly
assigned to one of the six treatment groups. Graduate business students were used as proxies for
managers. Given the experience and business knowledge of the graduate business students, this
participant group was deemed to have adequate knowledge to achieve the goals of the
experiment (Libby et al. 2002). Seybert (2010) uses M.B.A. students for a similar task and finds
evidence supporting this participant group has the knowledge necessary and sufficient to
meaningfully complete the task. Additionally, to help ensure that participants understood the
accounting concepts, the case materials explicitly explained the reporting and income
consequences of both decisions for the assigned R&D reporting method.

Task and Procedures

Participants read a hypothetical case where they were asked to assume the role of a
manager who faces a R&D investment decision. Experimental materials included an information
sheet describing informed consent, case materials, case questions, and a post-experimental
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questionnaire including questions related to manipulation checks, debriefing items, and
demographic variables. Participants were instructed to return the experimental materials back to
the administrator immediately after they finished the last section. During the experimental
session, participants were not allowed to communicate with one another about the task, which
required approximately 15 minutes to complete.

The case materials provide background information on the company, the independent
variable manipulations, and the decision context. Consistent with Seybert (2010), participants
were asked to assume the role of a R&D manager tasked with managing and evaluating the
investments in various R&D projects at a public company that produces electronic devices.
However, there is an important distinction from Seybert (2010). Rather than manipulating
project responsibility, all participants in this study were informed that they had recently been
reassigned the main case project to minimize the potential for escalation of commitment. The
case also included information about the financial goals of the company and the participants’
compensation structure. All participants were incentivized with a short-term (annual) bonus
equivalent to 30 percent of their salary if company earnings targets were met. This bonus rate is
consistent with rates reported in prior literature examining managerial compensation (e.g. Guidry
et al. 1999; Jackson et al. 2008; Hunton et al. 2008). Consistent with Guidry et al. (1999)
bonuses were awarded based on earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).

After the R&D reporting method and knowledge of supervisor compensation
manipulations, which are discussed in the next section, consistent with Seybert (2010)
participants were informed that the technology in the assigned project was not performing as
well as originally anticipated. Participants were presented with information about an alternative
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R&D project that required the same current investment but had higher expected future cash flows
than the original project.

In the expense condition, prior period expenditures were already deducted from net
income and recording an impairment loss would not be a concern for either of the project
choices. When R&D expenditures are capitalized, both the discounted and undiscounted future
cash flows of the original project asset exceed its carrying amount. Thus, under both U.S. GAAP
(i.e., SFAS No. 114, SFAS No. 142) and IFRS (i.e., IAS 36) an impairment loss would be
triggered if the original project was discontinued to write-down the value of the long-term asset
that was originally recorded in a prior year. The company would not have to recognize an
impairment loss if the project was continued. This created a conflict for participants in the
capitalization condition. If they chose to discontinue the original project to increase future period
cash flows, the impairment loss and related decrease in current period income prohibited them
from receiving their current year bonus. The bonus was not interrupted if participants chose to
continue with the original project.

After the case was created, it was pilot tested with 92 undergraduate business students at
a large state university. Slight revisions were made after the pilot test. The revisions were aimed
at improving the clarity of the experimental manipulations and decreasing the time required for
completing the experimental task.

Independent Variables

The first independent variable, R&D reporting method, was manipulated at two levels
(capitalize vs. expense). Participants were informed that R&D expenditures were either expensed
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or capitalized. Consistent with their treatment, participants also received information explaining
how the R&D reporting method impacted net income. Project-specific financial statements
prepared in accordance with the randomly assigned R&D reporting method were provided as a
supplement to the case materials. In the expense condition, current net income is not impacted by
the project continuation decision. However, discontinuing the original project and switching to
the alternative project improved future net income. In contrast, for participants in the
capitalization condition, switching to the alternative project triggered an impairment loss which
decreased current net income and excluded them from any bonus potential.

The second independent variable, knowledge of supervisor compensation, was
manipulated at three levels (knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of
restricted stock compensation). A control group with no knowledge of their supervisor’s
compensation was also included as the third level. Patterned after Bierstaker et al. (2012) and
consistent with practice, the compensation plan for all executives was comprised of 20 percent
cash and 80 percent stock compensation. In the short-term incentive horizon treatment the stock
compensation was described as non-restricted and could be sold at any time. In contrast, the
long-term incentive horizon was characterized by restricted long-term stock compensation that
could be sold five years after it was received. Consistent with prior research (i.e., Bierstaker et al.
2012; Magilke et al. 2009), the supervisor compensation package was deliberately simplistic to
provide a basic orientation of the compensation horizon.

Dependent Variable

Participants were required to allocate six million dollars of R&D funds in the current
year. They were asked to decide between the following two actions: (1) authorizing six million
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dollars to continue the original large LCD screen project, or (2) discontinuing the original large
LCD screen projected and authorizing the six million dollars to be used towards the development
of a new product. The primary dependent measure captured the likelihood of participants
continuing with the originally selected failing project as opposed to the new, more profitable
project. The dependent variable was captured with three different questions. This choice to
continue the original project or switch to the new project was captured in absolute terms.
Additionally, participants indicated their willingness to continue with the original project and
likelihood of switching to the new project on 11-point Likert scales.

Post-Experimental Questionnaire

The post-experimental questionnaire included questions related to manipulation checks,
debriefing items, and demographic variables. Two manipulation check questions about the
independent variables were included to ensure the participants attended to the details of the case
and to ascertain the validity of the dependent variable responses. Debriefing questions about the
independent variables were included to ensure that the manipulations had the intended effect.
Questions were also included to better understand the psychological motivations driving the
participants’ decisions. Demographic information about the participants’ education, age, gender,
and employment experience were also collected to test as potential covariates and to ascertain
randomization.

IV. RESULTS
Sample Demographics and Covariates
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A total of 161 graduate business students participated in the experiment. Table 1
summarizes participants’ demographic information. As indicated in Panels A and B, the average
participant was 27 years old (39.0 percent of the sample was between 20 and 24 years old).
Participants had approximately five years of professional work experience (45.2 percent of the
sample had between one and four years of work experience). Of the total sample, 103 (64.4
percent) were male. None of the collected demographic variables were significant covariates
(smallest p = 0.39). Accordingly, these variables were not included as covariates in the
subsequent analyses. To investigate randomization, R&D reporting method and managerial
knowledge of supervisor compensation were included as the independent variables in a
MANOVA model. The demographic variables were included as the dependent variables. A lack
of significance (smallest p = 0.42) provides reasonable assurance that the randomization
procedure was effective.

Manipulation Checks
To verify the successful manipulation of the independent variables, manipulation check
questions were included in the post-experimental questionnaire. The first question asked
participants to indicate whether R&D expenditures were expensed or capitalized. Of the 160
participants responding to this question, 147 (91.3 percent) responded correctly. The second
manipulation check question concerned supervisor incentive horizon. Participants designated
whether their supervisors’ stock compensation was short-term and available for immediate sale
or long-term and vesting in five years. Participants in the control group did not receive the
second manipulation check question. Of the 108 participants responding to this question, 98
(90.7 percent) responded correctly. To provide further assurance that participants properly
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attended to the experimental manipulations, only observations for participants that passed the
manipulation check questions (n = 138) were used for the analyses in the results that follow.3

TABLE 1
Participant Demographics
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations
Variable
Age
Work Experience

n
159
155

Mean
27.29
4.80

SD
5.97
5.73

Panel B: Frequencies and Percentages
Variable
Gender
Age

Professional Work Experience

Response
Male
Female
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40+
Less than 1 yr.
1-4 years
5-9 years
10+ years

n
103
57
62
54
30
9
4
28
70
35
22

Percent
64.4%
35.6%
39.0%
34.0%
18.9%
5.7%
2.5%
18.1%
45.2%
22.6%
14.2%

To provide further assurance that the responses to the dependent measures were not
confounded by escalation of commitment, participants were asked a question to gauge their
perceived involvement with the original LCD project. Participants indicated whether they made
the original decision to start the project or the project was reassigned to them because the
original project manager left the firm. Of the 161 participants that responded to this question,

3

The majority of results are unchanged if the participants that failed the manipulation check questions are included.
The main effect of R&D reporting method becomes insignificant if these participants are included.
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152 (94.4 percent) responded correctly, indicating a successful manipulation of original project
responsibility.

Dependent Variables

Descriptive statistics for each of the dependent measures, the absolute choice to continue
or discontinue the original project, likelihood of continuing the original project, and likelihood of
switching to the new project, are summarized in Table 2, Panels A, B, and C. Panel A provides a
contingency table with row percents for the absolute choice dependent measure. When
participants were asked to make an absolute choice between the two projects, 28 percent of
participants were willing to continue the original project. Participants who capitalized R&D
expenditures were more likely to continue the original project than participants who expensed
R&D expenditures (38.6 percent vs. 17.6 percent, respectively, t = 5.57, p < 0.01, one-tailed).
Participants with knowledge that their supervisors were compensated with short-term incentives
were more likely to continue the project than participants with no knowledge of their
supervisors’ compensation, but this difference is not statistically significant (32.6 percent vs.
28.9 percent, respectively, t = 0.76, p = 0.35, one-tailed). Participants with knowledge that their
supervisors were compensated with long-term incentives were insignificantly less likely to
continue the project than participants with no knowledge of their supervisors’ compensation
(23.4 percent vs. 28.9 percent, respectively, t = 1.19, p = 0.28, one-tailed).
As reported in Panel B, the mean likelihood of project continuation is 3.94 for all
participants. Participants who capitalized R&D expenditures were more likely than participants
who expensed R&D expenditures to continue the original project (4.14 vs. 3.75, respectively, t =
1.50, p = 0.23, one-tailed). Participants with knowledge that their supervisors were compensated
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with short-term incentives were more likely to continue the original project (4.13) than
participants with knowledge that their supervisors were compensated with long-term incentives
(3.94) or participants with no knowledge of supervisory compensation (3.78). However, the
mean differences between these groups were not statistically significant (t = 0.17 and p = 0.39,
and t = 0.67 and p = 0.28, respectively).
As reported in Panel C, the mean likelihood of switching to the new project is 7.04 for all
participants. Consistent with Panel B, the results presented in Panel C indicate that participants
who capitalized R&D expenditures were less likely to switch to the new project than participants
who expensed R&D expenditures (6.96 versus 7.13, respectively, t = 0.82 and p = 0.34, onetailed). Consistent with expectations, participants with knowledge that their supervisors were
compensated with short-term incentives were less likely (6.50) to switch to the new project than
participants with knowledge that their supervisors are compensated with long-term incentives
(7.50) and participants with no knowledge of supervisor compensation (6.83). However, the
mean differences were not statistically significant (t = 0.05 and p = 0.43, and t = 0.01 and p =
0.47, respectively).
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Results
Panel A: Contingency Table with Row Percents for Absolute Choice of Project Continuation
R&D Reporting Method
EXPa

Yes
12
17.6%
27
38.6%
39
28.3%

CAPb
Total

No
56
82.4%
43
61.4%
99
71.7%

Total
68
49.3%
70
50.7%
138
100.0%

Descriptive Results
Panel B: Means (Standard Deviations) for Likelihood of Continuing the Original Project
Variable
EXPa

CAPb

Average

NON
3.58
(3.13)
n = 24
4.73
(2.68)
n =22
4.13
(2.95)
n = 46

RES
4.22
(3.55)
n = 23
3.67
(3.34)
n = 24
3.94
(3.42)
n = 47

CONT
3.43
(3.03)
n = 21
4.08
(2.78)
n = 24
3.78
(2.88)
n = 45

Average
3.75
(3.22)
n = 68
4.14
(2.95)
n = 70
3.94
(3.07)
n = 138

Panel C: Means (Standard Deviations) for Likelihood of Switching to the New Project
Variable
EXPa

CAPb

Average

a
b

NON
7.62
(2.34)
n = 24
6.50
(2.13)
n =22
7.09
(2.29)
n = 46

RES
6.48
(2.81)
n = 23
7.50
(2.67)
n = 24
7.00
(2.78)
n = 47

EXP = Expense
CAP = Capitalize

33

CONT
7.29
(2.51)
n = 21
6.83
(2.46)
n = 24
7.04
(2.47)
n = 45

Average
7.13
(2.57)
n = 68
6.96
(2.44)
n = 70
7.04
(2.50)
n = 138

Table 3, Panel A presents the correlations between the independent and dependent variables.
The relationship between R&D reporting method and participants’ absolute decisions to continue
the original project was positive and significant (r = 0.23, p < 0.01, two-tailed). This suggests
that the tendency to recommend continuance was higher when R&D was capitalized relative to
when R&D was expensed. Table 3, Panel A presents the correlations between the independent
and dependent variables. The relationship between R&D reporting method and participants’
absolute decisions to continue the original project was positive and significant (r = 0.23, p <
0.01, two-tailed). This suggests that the tendency to recommend continuance was higher for
R&D capitalization in relation to immediately expensing R&D expenditures. In addition, as
anticipated, all of the dependent variable measures were significantly correlated (all p < 0.01).
To simplify the presentation of the results, the scaled dependent variables were combined to
create a single variable. To create the composite variable, the scaled dependent measure
capturing the likelihood of switching to the new project was reverse coded and averaged with the
other scaled dependent measure that captures the likelihood to continue the original project.
Therefore, a higher number represents a greater likelihood to continue the original project. This
leaves two dependent measures; (1) the absolute choice and (2) the composite measure.
Tests of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 explores the main effect of R&D reporting method. More specifically, it
investigates how the presence of personal short-term incentives influences a manager’s
propensity to engage in RM in the form of overinvestment in a failing project when R&D
expenditures are capitalized relative to when R&D expenditures are expensed. Hypotheses 2 and
3 investigate the influence of knowledge of a supervisor’s compensation on a manager’s
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TABLE 3
Bivariate Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables
Pearson (Spearman Rank) above (below) Diagonal

a

METH
COMPb
CONTc
SWITCHd
CHOICEe

METH
1.000
0.045
0.086
-0.066
0.232***

COMP
0.450
1.000
-0.060
0.017
-0.034

CONT
0.640
-0.047
1.000
-0.712***
0.674***

SWITCH
-0.350
-0.007
-0.683***
1.000
-0.700***

CHOICE
0.232***
-0.034
0.724***
-0.755***
1.000

a

METH = R&D reporting method; 1 if R&D expenditures were capitalized; 0 if expensed
COMP = Managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation; 0 if manager received information that supervisors
receive non-restricted stock compensation, 1 if manager received information that supervisors receive restricted
stock compensation, and 3 if the manager did not receive information about supervisor compensation (control)
c
CONT = Control group; no knowledge of supervisor compensation
d
SWITCH = composite dependent variable; 0 = Discontinue, 10 = Continue
e
CHOICE = Absolute choice dependent variable; 0 = Discontinue, 1 = Continue
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
b

propensity to engage in RM. More specifically, H2 postulates that when R&D expenditures are
capitalized, managers with knowledge that their supervisors are receiving short-term, nonrestricted stock compensation will be more willing to continue with the original project than
managers with no knowledge of their supervisors’ compensation. Managerial knowledge that
supervisors are receiving long-term, restricted stock compensation is predicted to have a
different impact. Hypothesis 3 posits that when R&D expenditures are capitalized, managers
with knowledge that their supervisors are receiving long-term, restricted stock compensation will
be less willing to continue with the original project than managers with no knowledge of their
supervisors’ compensation. Hypothesis 4 predicts an interaction between R&D reporting method
and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation. The difference in RM between the two
R&D reporting methods is expected to be greatest when managers have knowledge that their
supervisors are being compensated with short-term, non-restricted stock compensation, next
greatest when managers have no knowledge of supervisor compensation and lowest when
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managers have knowledge that their supervisors are compensated with long-term, restricted stock
compensation.
The hypotheses were first tested using logistic regression and discriminant analysis.
Results for the categorical dependent variable are presented in Table 4, Panel A. When all three
predictors were considered together, the model was significant (χ2 = 8.35, df = 3, N = 138, p <
0.10). Consistent with H1, the main effect for R&D reporting method was positive and
significant (p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 4.11. This suggests that capitalizing R&D
expenditures increases the odds of deciding to continue the project by 4.11 times. Managerial
knowledge of supervisor compensation had the next highest odds ratio (effect size) of 1.08.
However, the main effect for this variable (p = 0.84) as well as the interaction between R&D
reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation were not statistically
significant (p = 0.50). This suggests that there is no effect of managerial knowledge of supervisor
compensation structure on participants’ project continuance decisions and that this knowledge
does not moderate the effect of R&D reporting method.
Discriminant analysis was conducted to assess whether the two predictors could
distinguish participants who choose to continue the original project from those who did not.
Wilks’ lambda was significant, λ = 0.94, χ2 = 7.76, p < 0.05, which indicates that the model
including these two variables was able to significantly discriminate the two groups. As indicated
in Panel B of Table 4, the results from the discriminant analysis indicate that participants’
choices to continue the original project varies depending on R&D reporting method (χ2 = 7.76, p
< 0.01), but does not vary based on managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation (χ2 =
0.16, p = 0.69). This provides additional support for H1 but not the other hypotheses.

36

TABLE 4
Hypotheses Testing (Categorical Dependent Variable)
Panel A: Traditional Categorical Modeling Statistic Test (Logistic Regression)

Source
METHa
COMPb
METH*COMP
Constant

B
1.41
0.08
-0.34
-1.62

SE
0.64
0.39
0.50
0.50

Odds Ratio
4.11
1.08
0.71
0.20

Two-Tailed
p-value
0.03
0.84
0.50
0.00

Panel B: Discriminant Analysis

Source
METHa
COMPb

Chi-Square Statistic
7.76
0.158

df
1
1

Two-Tailed
p-value
0.006
0.692

a

METH = R&D reporting method; 1 if R&D expenditures were capitalized; 0 if expensed
COMP = Managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation; 0 if manager received information that supervisors
receive non-restricted stock compensation, 1 if manager received information that supervisors receive restricted
stock compensation, and 3 if the manager did not receive information about supervisor compensation (control)
b

The hypotheses were also tested with an ANOVA, including the composite measure of
project continuation as the dependent variable and R&D reporting method and managerial
knowledge of supervisor compensation as the independent variables.4 Table 5 presents the
results. As predicted, participants were more likely to continue the original project and less likely
to switch to the alternative project when R&D expenditures were capitalized relative to
expensed. However, as indicated in Panel A, the main effect for R&D reporting method was not
significant (F = 0.47, p = 0.49, two-tailed). This does not support H1. The main effect for
4

Through randomly sampling and assignment, assumptions of independent observations were met. The skewness
for each group of the dependent variable was < +/-1.0 indicating that the distribution of the dependent variable was
approximately normal. Levene’s test was not statistically significant (p = 0.71). Thus, the assumption of
homogeneity of variances was not violated.
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managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation was also insignificant (F = 0.07, p = 0.93,
two-tailed). Again, the results are inconsistent with the predictions (H2 and H3). These main
effect results must be viewed in light of the predicted interaction between the R&D reporting
method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation variables.
Hypothesis 4 predicts an interaction between R&D reporting method and managerial
knowledge of supervisor compensation. As hypothesized, when R&D expenditures were
capitalized, managers with knowledge that their supervisors were compensated with nonrestricted stock compensation were the most likely to continue the original project, followed by
participants with no knowledge of supervisor compensation and participants with knowledge that
their supervisors were compensated with restricted stock compensation, respectively. However,
the interaction term was not statistically significant (F = 1.71, p = 0.19, two-tailed) indicating
that the impact of R&D reporting method on RM was not dependent on managerial knowledge
of supervisor compensation. Figure 1 illustrates the observed interaction pattern.

FIGURE 1
Observed Interaction Plot
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In addition to ANOVA, given the predicted ordinal interaction, planned contrast analyses
were conducted to provide a more powerful test of the hypotheses.5 Two alternative sets of
contrast weights were utilized to test H1and H4 (see Panel B of Table 5). Simple effects tests
were used to assess H2 and H3 and further interpret H4. The first contrast (-1, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1)
consists of the weights +1 for the capitalize conditions and -1 for the expense conditions and
tests whether the likelihood to continue the original project is higher when R&D expenditures are
capitalized compared to when expenditures are expensed. Consistent with the findings of the
ANOVA, the contrast is not statistically significant (F = 0.69, p = 0.49, two-tailed) (see Panel C
of Table 5).
The contrast between D (capitalize and control) and E (capitalize and non-restricted stock
compensation) can be used to further investigate H2. The contrast confirms that there is not a
statistically significant difference in the propensity to engage in RM when R&D expenditures are
capitalized between participants with no knowledge of managerial compensation and participants
with knowledge that managers are compensated with non-restricted stock compensation (F =
0.64, p = 0.52). Thus, H2 is not supported. The contrast between D (capitalize and control) and F
(capitalize and restricted stock compensation) concerns H3. The contrast provides no evidence of
a significant difference (F = 0.73, p = 0.47) in the likelihood of continuing the original project
between participants with no knowledge of supervisor compensation and participants with
knowledge that supervisors receive restricted stock compensation when R&D expenditures are
capitalized.

5

Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) argue that the traditional ANOVA is not powerful for testing hypotheses
involving ordinal interactions. Contrast analysis was deemed to be a more appropriate test of the predictions in this
study as it improves statistical power over ANOVA without increasing Type I error rates.
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The second planned interaction contrast (-2, -2, -2, 2, 3, 1) was also insignificant (F =
1.03, p = 0.31). Follow-up simple effect tests reveal that there is not a significant difference in
the mean likelihood to continue the original project between participants with knowledge that
their supervisors received non-restricted versus participants with knowledge that their
supervisors received restricted stock compensation when R&D expenditures are capitalized (F =
1.36, p = 0.18). Consequently, the statistical results for the composite dependent variable do not
provide support for any of the hypotheses.
Supplemental Analyses
Using the data that was collected in the post-experimental questionnaire, the
supplemental analyses further investigate some of the assumptions that were used to develop the
hypotheses related to managerial knowledge of executive compensation. Moral disengagement
theory and attribution theory were used to develop H2. Per moral disengagement theory it is
expected that managers will be able to more easily justify RM and thus be more likely to
continue a failing project when the benefit of doing so is shared. Participants were asked to
indicate the extent to which they believed they would be able to justify continuing the original
project. Responses were measured on an 11-point Likert scale anchored at “not at all justifiable”
(0) and “completely justifiable” (10) with a mean response of 5.04. Contrary to expectations,
participants capitalizing R&D expenditures with knowledge that their supervisors were
compensated with short-term incentives did not perceive continuing the original project to be
more justifiable than participants in the other cells.6

6

A T-test and an ANOVA model with perceived ability to justify continuing the original project as the dependent
variable and R&D reporting method and knowledge of supervisor compensation as the independent variables were
used to test this assumption. The results (not tabulated) were not significant (all p > 0.10).
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TABLE 5
Hypotheses Testing (Composite Dependent Variable)
Panel A: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Source
METHa
COMPb
METH*COMP
Error

Sum of
Squares
3.1
0.9
22.6
874.4

Mean
Square
3.1
0.5
11.3
6.6

df
1
2
2
132

Fstatistic
0.47
0.07
1.71

Two-Tailed
p-value
0.49
0.93
0.19

Panel B: Contrast Coefficients

Contrast
1
2

Cell A:
EXPc &
CONTd
-1
-2

Cell B:
EXPc &
NONe
-1
-2

Cell C:
EXPc &
RESf
-1
-2

Cell D:
CAPg &
CONTd
+1
+2

Cell E:
CAPg &
NONe
+1
+3

Cell F:
CAPg
& RESf
+1
+1

Panel C: Planned Contrast Tests and Follow-Up Simple Effect Tests
Source
Contrast 1 (-1, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1) Overall Test:
Expected likelihood of project continuation is greatest
when R&D expenditures are capitalized and lowest when
R&D expenditures are expensed.
Contrast 2 (-2, -2, -2, 2, 3, 1) Overall Test:
Expected likelihood of project continuation is greatest
when R&D expenditures are capitalized and managers
have knowledge that supervisors receive non-restricted
stock compensation, next greatest when R&D
expenditures are capitalized and managers have no
knowledge of supervisor compensation, next greatest
when R&D expenditures are capitalized and managers
have knowledge that supervisors receive restricted stock
compensation, and significantly lower in the other three
(expense) conditions.
Follow-up Simple Effect Tests:
(1) D versus E
(2) D versus F
(3) E versus F
a

t-statistic
(two-tailed)
0.69

p-value
0.49

1.03

0.31

0.64
0.73
1.36

0.52
0.47
0.18

METH = R&D reporting method; 1 if R&D expenditures were capitalized; 0 if expensed
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b

COMP = Managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation; 0 if manager received information that supervisors
receive non-restricted stock compensation, 1 if manager received information that supervisors receive restricted
stock compensation, and 3 if the manager did not receive information about supervisor compensation (control)
c
EXP = Expense
d
CONT = Control group; no knowledge of supervisor compensation
e
NON = Non-restricted stock compensation; can be sold at any time
f
RES = Restricted stock compensation; can be sold five years after receipt
g
CAP = Capitalize

When supervisors have short-term incentives, attribution theory suggests that their
subordinates will likely assume that the supervisors would make and expect their subordinates to
make wealth maximizing choices. Thus, when R&D expenditures are capitalized, managers
likely shifted some or all of the responsibility away from themselves and onto their supervisors.
Given this reasoning, when R&D expenditures are capitalized, a negative association is expected
between perceived personal responsibility and knowledge that supervisors receive short-term,
non-restricted stock compensation. Alternatively stated, it is expected that perceived personal
responsibility will be the lowest in the cell where R&D expenditures are capitalized and
managers have knowledge that their supervisors receive similar non-restricted stock
compensation.

Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt they would be held personally
responsible for the outcome of their investment decisions. The responses were measured on an
11-point Likert scale anchored at “not at all responsible” (0) and “completely responsible” (10).
The mean response for this question was 7.37. Results from an ANOVA with participant
responses to the aforementioned question as the dependent variable and R&D reporting method
and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation as the independent variables are
presented in Panel A of Table 6. While the main effects of R&D reporting method and
managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation were not significant (F = 0.39 and 0.72, p =
0.39 and 0.72, two-tailed, respectively), the interaction between these terms was significant (F =
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3.69, p < 0.05). Panel A of Figure 2 plots the observed interaction results and suggests perceived
personal responsibility is significantly lower when R&D expenditures are capitalized and
managers have knowledge that their supervisors receive non-restricted stock compensation.

Since the interaction is significant, it is possible that there are significant main effects that
are masked by the significant interaction. This means there may be no differences between the
two methods or there are differences that the statistical test cannot determine. A planned contrast
analysis was used to further explore the interaction between R&D reporting method and
managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on perceived personal responsibility. The
contrast (-1,-1,-1,-1, 5, -1) weights Cell E (capitalize and non-restricted) 5 and the remaining
cells receive a weight of -1. As predicted, the contrast is statistically significant (F = -2.31, p <
.05, two-tailed) (see Panel B of Table 6). Consistent with attribution theory, these results suggest
that when R&D expenditures are capitalized, participants with knowledge that their supervisors
receive non-restricted stock compensation felt significantly less responsible for the outcomes of
their decisions.

Self-presentation theory was the primary theory used to develop H3. When R&D
expenditures are capitalized and managers have knowledge that supervisors receive restricted
stock compensation, self-presentation theory suggests that managers may make choices that they
feel will be viewed favorably by their supervisors in order to manage their supervisors’
perceptions or impressions of them as subordinates. This theory implies that the personal
financial gains that managers would receive from making the decision to continue a failing R&D
project will likely be outweighed by the increased perceived need to justify their decisions and
the desire to maintain a positive reputation in the organization. Impression management can be
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motivated by the social presence of others whose behaviors individuals are trying to anticipate or
by the desire to maximize rewards and minimize sanctions. Consistent with self-presentation
theory, it can be expected that participants in the capitalization condition who have knowledge
that their supervisors receive restricted stock compensation will be the most concerned about
pleasing their supervisors and the likelihood of possible negative personal repercussions.

In the post-experimental questionnaire, participants were asked to rate the importance of
making a decision to please the CTO and the likelihood that continuing the project would result
in negative personal repercussions. The responses were measured on an 11-point Likert scale
anchored at “not important at all” (0) and “very important” (10) and “not likely at all” (0) and
“very likely” (10), respectively. The mean responses for these questions were 5.05 and 5.65,
respectively. Similar to the analysis above, two ANOVA models with these questions as the
dependent variables and R&D reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor
compensation as the independent variables and planned contrasts were conducted (see Panels C
through E of Table 6).

The main effects of R&D reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor
compensation were not significant (F = 0.05 and 0.79, p = 0.83 and 0.38, respectively) in the
ANOVA with importance of making a decision to please the CTO as the dependent variable.7
The interaction between R&D reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor
compensation was significant (F = 4.07, p < 0.05). Again there is the potential that there are
significant main effects that are masked by the significant interaction. The observed interaction
results are presented in Panel B of Figure 2. As anticipated, the importance of making a decision

7

The control group did not receive this question and therefore was excluded from the analyses described in this
paragraph.
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that will please the CTO appears to be significantly higher when R&D expenditures are
capitalized and managers have knowledge that supervisors receive restricted stock compensation.
Results from the contrast analysis confirm this presumption (F = 1.82, p < 0.10).
The results from the ANOVA including participants’ perceived likelihood of project
continuation leading to negative personal repercussions as the dependent variable provides
slightly different results. In this model, the main effect for managerial knowledge of supervisor
compensation is significant (F = 2.40, p < 0.10) whereas the main effect for R&D reporting
method and the interaction term are not (F = .050 and 0.25, p = 0.48 and 0.78, respectively). The
observed interaction results are presented in Panel C of Figure 2. Participants with knowledge
that their supervisors receive restricted stock compensation are significantly more concerned
about the likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method.
Collectively, these findings suggest self-presentation theory is beneficial for explaining the
results.

TABLE 6
Supplemental Analyses
Panel A: Perceived Personal Responsibility Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Source
METHa
COMPb
METH*COMP
Error

Sum of
Squares
3.3
2.8
32.0
572.9

Mean
Square
3.3
1.4
16.0
4.3

df
1
2
2
132
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F-statistic
0.75
0.32
3.67

Two-Tailed
p-value
0.39
0.72
0.03

TABLE 6 (continued)
Supplemental Analyses
Panel B: Planned Contrast Test (Personal Responsibility)
Source
Contrast 1 (-1, -1, -1, -1, 5, -1) Overall Test:
Expected perceived personal responsibility is lowest when R&D
expenditures are capitalized and managers have knowledge that
supervisors receive non-restricted stock compensation.

t-statistic
(two-tailed)
-2.31

p-value
0.02

Panel C: Importance of Making a Decision that Pleases CTO Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Source
METHa
COMPb
METH*COMP
Error

Sum of
Squares
0.4
5.9
30.3
662.4

Mean
Square
0.4
5.9
30.3
7.4

df
1
1
1
89

F-statistic
0.05
0.79
4.07

Two-Tailed
p-value
0.83
0.38
0.05

Panel D: Planned Contrast Test (Importance of Making a Decision that Pleases CTO)
Source
Contrast 1 (-1, -1, -1, 3) Overall Test:
Expected perceived personal responsibility is lowest
when R&D expenditures are capitalized and managers
have knowledge that supervisors receive non-restricted
stock compensation.

t-statistic
(two-tailed)
1.82

p-value
0.07

Panel E: Likelihood of Negative Personal Repercussions Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Source
METHa
COMPb
METH*COMP
Error

Sum of
Squares
2.4
23.0
2.4
632.1

Mean
Square
2.4
11.5
1.2
4.8

df
1
2
2
132

a

Fstatistic
0.50
2.40
0.25

Two-Tailed
p-value
0.48
0.095
0.78

METH = R&D reporting method; 1 if R&D expenditures were capitalized; 0 if expensed
COMP = Managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation; 0 if manager received information that supervisors
receive non-restricted stock compensation, 1 if manager received information that supervisors receive restricted
stock compensation, and 3 if the manager did not receive information about supervisor compensation (control)
b
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FIGURE 2
Supplemental Analyses
Panel A: R&D Reporting Method by Managerial Knowledge of Supervisor Compensation (Three
Levels) on Mean Perceived Personal Responsibility

Panel B: R&D Reporting Method by Managerial Knowledge of Supervisor Compensation (Three
Levels) on Mean Importance of Making a Decision to Please the CTO
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FIGURE 2 (continued)
Supplemental Analyses
Panel C: R&D Reporting Method by Managerial Knowledge of Supervisor Compensation (Three
Levels) on Mean Perceived Likelihood of Project Continuation Resulting in Negative Personal
Repercussions

V. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This dissertation seeks to develop a better understanding of the potential for RM when
R&D expenditures are capitalized and contributes to the debate on the pros and cons of
expensing versus capitalizing R&D expenditures. Prior research finds a significant difference in
RM between R&D expensing and capitalization when managers are personally responsible for
the original investment decision (Seybert 2010). This study responds to Healy and Wahlen’s
(1999) call for additional research to provide a better understanding of the factors that contribute
to and limit earnings management. It also extends the literature on R&D by providing evidence
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of the potential for RM when R&D expenditures are capitalized in the absence of personal
responsibility.
Using salient short-term incentives to motivate RM, this study removes the confounding
influence of escalation of commitment and demonstrates that capitalization can have
dysfunctional consequences even when there is no commitment to the project. When managers
were asked to make an absolute decision to continue or discontinue the original project,
managers were more likely to continue the project when R&D expenditures were capitalized
relative to expensed. One implication of this study is that in the presence of economic incentives,
R&D capitalization may result in managers foregoing economically efficient R&D investment
opportunities. This in turn suggests that there is the potential for RM in the absence of personal
responsibility. However, in the absence of an absolute choice the differential impact on project
continuation between the two R&D reporting methods was less clear. While participants
indicated that they were more likely to continue the original project and less likely to switch to
the new project when R&D expenditures were capitalized, the difference in the mean response
between the two reporting methods was not statistically significant.
This dissertation also contributes to understanding the influence of the effects of the
incentive structure of the manager’s supervisor. Specifically, it attempts to determine whether
knowledge of an executive’s compensation package will impact the project continuation
decisions of that individual’s subordinates and if a firm’s R&D reporting method interacts with
knowledge of executive compensation to impact managerial decisions on R&D project
continuation. Prior research and theory suggests that there may be both functional and
dysfunctional effects of capitalizing R&D expenditures that depend upon the incentives of those
above the decision maker. Building on moral disengagement theory and attribution theory, it was
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anticipated that knowledge of supervisors receiving short-term, non-restricted stock
compensation would have a dysfunctional effect (i.e., managers with this knowledge were
expected to be more likely to engage in RM than managers with no knowledge of supervisor
compensation). In contrast, self-presentation theory suggests that knowledge of supervisors
receiving long-term restricted stock compensation should curb managers’ opportunistic behavior
(i.e., managers with this knowledge were expected to be less likely to engage in RM than
managers with no knowledge of supervisor compensation).
The results of this study do not support the hypotheses that managerial knowledge of
supervisor compensation structure influences R&D project continuation choices. However,
analyses of the debriefing questions provide some meaningful insight into the potential
psychological effects of managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation in managerial
decision making. Consistent with attribution theory, when decision makers that capitalized R&D
expenditures had knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted stock compensation
their perceived personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. This suggests that
the presence of an additional beneficiary allows managers to shift some of the responsibility of
RM away from themselves and onto their supervisors.
Participants who capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor
received restricted, long-term stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to
please the CTO significantly higher than all other participants. This suggests that knowledge that
the supervisor’s compensation structure incentivizes long-term earnings amplified managers
tendencies to make decisions that were in the best long-term interest of the company.
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Interestingly, participants with knowledge that their supervisors received restricted stock
compensation were significantly more concerned about the likelihood of negative personal
repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. One interpretation of this finding could be
that compensation with long-term, restricted stock indicates that supervisors will have a more
long-term orientation and desire what is best for the firm long-term. Continuing a failing project,
even if it does not impact current year earnings, is not in the best interest of the firm long-term.
Thus, regardless of R&D reporting method, managers with knowledge that supervisors are
compensated with restricted stock compensation will have heightened concerns about the
negative personal repercussions of continuing a failing project. In contrast, non-restricted stock
compensation implies more of a short-term orientation and does not trigger the same level of
concern. These findings imply that managerial knowledge of executive compensation may have
implications for other types of managerial decisions.
This study employs the rigor of the experimental method to isolate the effects of R&D
reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation. It would have been
difficult to isolate the effects of these two variables or to obtain access to data to test the
hypotheses using archival methods. Thus, an experiment was deemed the most appropriate
method for studying the research questions proposed in this dissertation. An experimental setting
also has the benefit of controlling for other individual characteristics that may influence
managers’ decisions in this context. Additionally, by using an experimental setting it was
possible to rule out other confounding factors that may be present in the naturally occurring
archival settings. The controlled environment made possible by using experimental design
provides a high level of internal validity. However, similar to other experiments, external validity
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is a limitation of this type of design. Thus, one must use caution when generalizing the results to
other situations or when assessing the magnitude of the discovered effects in the real world.
This dissertation is also subject to other limitations. Graduate business students were used
as a proxy for managers. While the experience and business knowledge of this participant group
was deemed adequate to achieve the goals of the experiment, differences may exist between the
student proxies and actual managers. Case materials were developed to be as realistic as possible,
but experimental realism remains a concern. The task and information presentation may differ or
be an over-simplification of what would be available to managers in the real world. Additionally,
participants may not have felt as emotionally committed to the situation as managers who are
actually faced with making R&D project continuation decisions. Thus, an experiment may not
adequately reflect what participants would do if they were faced with this situation outside of the
controlled experimental setting. Finally, participants received hypothetical compensation and so
it is unclear whether the results would be markedly different if participants received real
compensation.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this dissertation provides an initial investigation into
how the compensation structure of executive management changes the R&D decisions of lower
level managers which provides both interesting insights and potential for future research. The
supplemental analyses suggest that managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation influences
the way managers approach decision making. Examining whether other managerial decisions are
influenced by knowledge of executive compensation could be a fruitful area for future research.
This study focuses solely on financial performance measures and incentives. Future research
could vary the bonus amounts or investigate the role of non-financial performance measures. In
the current study, discontinuing the project results in a loss when R&D expenditures are
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capitalized. It would be interesting to investigate whether managers respond differently in a nonloss scenario. This study could also be extended to include other factors which may affect their
judgment related to resource allocation such as the relationship between supervisors and
subordinates, the corporate culture, cultural differences, among others.
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